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AT&T CORP. V. MICROSOFT CORP:
CLOSING THE DEEPSOUTH LOOPHOLE (FOR
GOOD THIS TIME)
Nicholaus R. Rericha∗

I.

INTRODUCTION

Recently, Microsoft Corporation has come under a heavy barrage of
attacks for violating 35 U.S.C. § 271(f).1 This statute protects patent holders
against potential infringers that ship components of a patented product to be
assembled and sold overseas without obtaining rights.2
Software patent holders, including AT&T, have successfully argued
that Microsoft violated § 271(f) when it “supplied” a “component,” the
patented software, to a foreign country by means of a limited number of
“golden master disks.”3 These master disks contain the Windows®
operating system and are used to copy Windows® onto computers that will
be sold to foreign customers.4 Microsoft operates this way because it is less
expensive and more efficient to send one disk to the country of final
assembly rather than thousands of disks.5 In AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft
Corp., Microsoft sent a speech codec,6 which was patented by AT&T, on a

_______________________________________________________
∗ Nick Rericha is a Staff Writer for the University of Dayton Law Review 2005-2006. He graduated
with a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from G.M.I in Flint, MI in 2000. His Juris Doctorate is expected in
May of 2007.
1
35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2006). Infringement of Patent:
(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States
all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention, where such components
are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the combination of
such components outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if
such combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States
any component of a patented invention that is especially made or especially adapted for use in
the invention and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use, where such component is uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that
such component is so made or adapted and intending that such component will be combined
outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination
occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer. Id
2
Id. This statute is meant to prevent an infringer from manufacturing a patented product into pieces, and
then shipping the pieces overseas for assembly.
3
AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
4
Id. at 1368.
5
Id. at 1370 (Microsoft would be required to pay for the shipping costs of sending thousands of disks
instead of one if it chose to not send a golden master disk).
6
See infra nn. 50-53 and accompanying text (stating that a speech codec is a software algorithm that
reduces the original file size of a sound into a more compact and manageable file).
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golden master disk for replication overseas.7
The issues in the recent Federal Circuit cases in which Microsoft
was found to have violated § 271(f) relate to the interpretation of both the
meaning of § 271(f) and the holdings of other case law dealing with this
issue.8 The first issue is whether software is considered a component within
the context of § 271(f).9 The next issue is whether Microsoft supplied that
component to a foreign assembler by sending one golden master disk to be
copied.10 The final issue is whether the Pellegrini v. Analog Devices Inc.11
decision should compel reversal.12 The Pellegrini Court held that sending
instructions overseas for a foreign manufacturer to manufacture the patented
product does not violate § 271(f).13
This Note will analyze and critique the arguments in AT&T Corp.
and will argue that the case was ultimately decided correctly. Software, as
patentable subject matter,14 is a “component” because it is required for
Windows® to operate correctly.15 This Note will argue that software should
not be considered a process for patentability purposes, but as a product.
This consideration will forever close the loophole that Microsoft has
attempted to utilize.
Next, Microsoft supplied the patented software to a foreign
manufacturer when it shipped a disk containing the codec via a golden
master disk from the U.S. Finally, the holding in Pellegrini is distinguished
from all cases involving § 271(f) and software once and for all because,
unlike the instructions in Pellegrini, the software in AT&T Corp. is the
actual component supplied by Microsoft.16
Section II of this Note will discuss the factual background of the
case as well as the procedural history. It will also include a discussion about

_______________________________________________________
7

AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1370.
Id. (holding that software is a component that is supplied when shipped on a golden master disk); Eolas
Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Holding “that ‘components,’
according to section 271(f)(1), includes software code on golden master disks.”).
9
AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1368.
10
Id.
11
375 F.3d 1113, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that “§271(f) clearly refers to physical supply of
components, not simply to the supply of instructions or corporate oversight. In other words, although
Analog [Devices] may be giving instructions from the United States that cause the components of the
patented invention to be supplied, it is undisputed that those components are not being supplied in or
from the United States.”). For more information regarding the Pellegrini decision, see infra § II(B).
12
AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1370 (“reject[ing] Microsoft’s argument that [Pellegrini] compels reversal”).
13
Pellegrini, 375 F.3d at 1118.
14
Software was held not patentable subject matter until the Diamond v. Diehr decision in 1981.
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); see infra. nn. 99-110 and accompanying text.
15
Without sound compression, Windows® would require a much larger amount of hard drive space on a
user’s computer, causing the computer system to become bogged down. See infra. nn. 50-53 and
accompanying text.
16
Software instructions are in no way similar to instructions on how to build an integrated circuit. See
infra, §§ II(B) (discussing the background of Pellegrini) and III(C) (arguing that the holding in Pellegrini
is not relevant to software cases).
8
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the Deepsouth decision. Section III will discuss the statutory interpretations
of § 271(f) by both the majority and the dissenting opinions. This Section
will also discuss the conflicting findings of the intent of Congress and the
interpretation in light of Pellegrini. Section IV will conclude that, although
software is intangible, it is a product much like physical products. By
shipping AT&T’s patented product on a golden master disk for foreign
manufacture, Microsoft is liable under § 271(f).
II.

BACKGROUND

Section 271(f) was born out of a reaction against the Supreme
Court’s decision in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.17 To fully
understand the issues discussed in this Note, it is helpful to review the
Deepsouth decision and the historical development of § 271(f). First, this
Section will provide a background on the Deepsouth decision, and how the
law has changed as a result of its holding. Next, it will discuss the facts and
procedural history of AT&T Corp. Finally, it will provide an overview of
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s (CAFC) reasoning in the case.
A.

The Deepsouth Decision and the Development of § 271(f)

The addition of § 271(f) was part of the Patent Law Amendments of
1984.18 This addition was in response to the Supreme Court’s holding in
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.19
Both parties in Deepsouth held patents for machinery that devein20
shrimp in an efficient manner.21 After extensive litigation, it was
determined that Laitram held the superior patent.22 At the time of the
decision, United States patent law defined an infringer as one who “without
authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United
States.”23 Because the patent laws were only effective within the United
States, to avoid infringement, Deepsouth would send the deveining machine
parts in three boxes to foreign customers for assembly overseas.24
The Supreme Court had to decide whether “Deep-south [was]
barred from the American market by Laitram’s patents [by shipping the

_______________________________________________________
17

406 U.S. 518 (1972).
35 U.S.C. § 271(f). Subsection (f) was added November 8, 1984. Supra n. 1.
19
See 130 Cong. Rec. H10525 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5827, 5828).
“This proposal responds to the United States Supreme Court decision in Deepsouth[ ], concerning the
need for a legislative solution to close a loophole.” Id. “[The proposal] adds to the exclusive right[ ] . . .
to exclude others from importing into the United States products produced by a process covered by the
patent.” Id.
20
A deveining machine is used to remove the “veins” from under the shell of the shrimp. The veins are
actually intestine sacks that run along the length of the shrimp’s body. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 519.
21
Id. at 519.
22
Id.; Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1971).
23
Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 522 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1952)).
24
Id. at 523-24.
18
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deveiners] in less than fully assembled form, for use abroad.”25 This issue
turned on whether a product substantially manufactured in the United States
is the equivalent to a product that is made in the United States.26 The Court
stated that Laitram needed to show that Deepsouth made, used or sold the
patented deveining machine within the United States.27 The Court rejected
Laitram’s argument that “substantial manufacture” was the equivalent of
“make” under § 271, holding that making requires full assembly.28 In
holding that “substantial manufacture” is not the equivalent of “make,” the
Court reaffirmed the Second Circuit’s holding in Radio Corp. of America v.
Andrea,29 which held “that unassembled export of the elements of an
invention did not infringe the patent.”30 The Court also stated that it “would
require a clear signal from Congress” to interpret § 271 to cover pieces of
parts to be assembled later overseas.31
In 1984, Congress sent a clear signal to the Court by adding Section
(f) to § 271. Congress agreed with the position of Justice Blackmun in his
prophetic dissent in Deepsouth. Justice Blackmun posited that a loophole
was created within the Patent Act where “an infringer [could] set up shop
next door to a patent-protected inventor whose product enjoys a substantial
foreign market and deprive him of this valuable business.”32 Justice
Blackmun also stated that the majority’s application of § 271 would allow
an infringer to “reap the fruits of the American economy . . . but would not
be subject to the responsibilities of the American patent laws.”33
By adding Section (f) to § 271, Congress closed the loophole
created by Deepsouth.34 The provision now makes it an infringement to
supply or cause to be supplied a component to a patented product without
permission from the patent holder.35 This provision, had it been enacted at
the time of Deepsouth, would have changed the result of the Deepsouth

_______________________________________________________
25

Id. at 519.
Id. at 527 (“The . . . question thus resolves itself into the question of manufacture: did Deepsouth
‘make’ (and then sell) something cognizable under the patent law as the patented invention, or did it
‘make’ (and then sell) something that fell short of infringement?”).
27
Id.
28
Id. at 528 (holding “[w]e cannot endorse the view that the ‘substantial manufacture of the constituent
parts of [a] machine’ constitutes direct infringement when we have so often held that a combination
patent protects only against the operable assembly of the whole and not the manufacture of its parts”)
(citations omitted).
29
79 F.2d 626, 629 (2d Cir. 1935) (holding “[n]o wrong is done [upon] the patentee until the
combination is formed. His monopoly does not cover the manufacture or sale of separate elements
capable of being, but never actually, associated to form the invention. Only when such association is
made is there a direct infringement of his monopoly, and not even then if it is done outside the territory
for which the monopoly was granted.”).
30
Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 529.
31
Id. at 532.
32
Id. at 534 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
33
Id.
34
35 U.S.C. § 271(f).
35
Id.
26
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case; Deepsouth would not have been permitted to build the machine in
thirds and then ship them to a foreign country for assembly without
permission from Laitram.
B.

Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc.

Pellegrini is relevant to AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp. because it
held that sending instructions on how to fabricate a patented product to
foreign manufacturers did not violate § 271(f).36 Parties and courts have
also interpreted Pellegrini to mean that only physical components are
covered by the statute.37
Gerald Pellegrini (“Pellegrini”) is the inventor of patented brushless
motor drive integrated circuits.38 Analog Devices (“Analog”) fabricates and
sells the integrated circuits overseas.39 Pellegrini sued Analog for direct
infringement and inducement of infringement in the foreign
manufacturers.40 Pellegrini’s argument was that because Analog was
headquartered in the United States, and it provided the foreign
manufacturers instructions on how to make the integrated circuits, Analog
violated § 271(f).41 The issue before the CAFC was whether § 271(f) is
violated when an alleged infringer sends instructions on how to manufacture
a patented product overseas without the patent holder’s permission.42 The
CAFC stated that § 271(f) only applies “where components of a patent
invention are physically present in the United States and then either sold or
exported.”43 The CAFC held that § 271(f) only applies to the “physical
supply of components,” therefore supplying instructions does not violate §
271(f).44 This Note will argue that this language, which was used by the
CAFC, was unfortunate because software companies have used it to argue
that software does not fall within § 271(f) because it is not physical.
C.

AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.

Microsoft is a global corporation that sells its Windows® Operating
System (“Windows®”) all over the world. To distribute Windows® to

_______________________________________________________
36

Pellegrini, 375 F.3d at 1118.
In the principal case of this Note, Microsoft argues that Pellegrini limits § 271(f) to physical
components that are physically exported from the United States. AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1368. The
Court in Eolas upheld the decision in Pellegrini by stating that the components must be physically
supplied from the United States. Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1340.
38
Pellegrini, 375 F.3d at 1114.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 1115.
42
Id. (“This case presents the question whether components that are manufactured outside the United
States and never physically shipped to or from the United States may nonetheless be ‘supplied or caused
to be supplied in or from the United States’ within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) if those
components are designed within the United States and the instructions for their manufacture and
disposition are transmitted from within the United States.”).
43
Id. at 1117.
44
Id. at 1118.
37
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foreign original equipment manufacturers in the most efficient manner
possible, Microsoft sends one golden master disk, created in the United
States, to foreign replicators. Microsoft sends one disk, instead of
thousands or millions because it can save money on shipping and import and
export costs.45 In addition to using a golden master disk, Microsoft also
sends a master copy of Windows® via electronic transmission.46 Under an
agreement with Microsoft, these replicators make copies of the master
Windows® disk and then distribute them to foreign computer assemblers.47
The assemblers then install the operating system onto computers that are
shipped to foreign customers.48 No foreign replicated version of Windows®
is sold in the U.S.49
Windows® contains an AT&T speech codec that is the subject
matter of AT&T’s United States Reissue Patent No. 32,580 (“the ’580
patent”).50 A speech codec51 is a software program that converts human
voice and audible sounds into a compact form, and then decodes the
compacted signal back into audible sound to be sent to a speaker.52 Speech
codecs are useful because they lower the amount of required memory to
store the information on a computer by compressing the information.
Microsoft relies on AT&T’s ’580 patent to keep the size of Windows®
speech and sound files manageable so that the operating system requires less
space on a hard drive. One current example of a type of sound encoding and
compression that is popular today is the mp3 file format.53

_______________________________________________________
45
AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1368 (stating that “Microsoft has taken full advantage of the replicable nature
of software to efficiently distribute Windows® internationally”).
46
Id. (stating that electronic transmission includes consumer downloading). For example, instead of a
potential Adobe Photo Shop customer driving to a retail store to buy the popular photograph editing
software, the customer may choose to point his or her browser to Adobe’s website and purchase the
software by paying and then downloading the software directly to his or her computer. Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3340 at *5 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 5, 2004).
Microsoft relies on this technology to compress speech and sound files into a manageable size. Without
the codec technology, Windows® would take up more space on the computer’s hard drive. This would
leave less space available on the hard disk for the computer user’s personal data.
51
A “codec” is defined as a Compression/Decompression Module. Mountain Data Systems, Acronym
Finder,
http://www.acronymfinder.com/af-query.asp?p=dict&String=exact&Acronym=CODEC (accessed Mar.
8, 2006). “A ‘speech codec’ is a software program that codes a speech signal into a more compact form,
and decodes it back into a signal that sounds like the original.” AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1368 n. 1. One
current example of a type of sound encoding and compression that is popular today is the mp3 file
format. See generally Mary Bell, About, Inc., The New York Times Co.,
http://inventors.about.com/od/mstartinventions/a/MPThree.htm (accessed Mar. 8, 2006) [hereinafter
Bell]. Although it is not a true example of a speech codec, the mp3 encoder program compresses the
music or speech and then the mp3 player completes the process by decoding the file into audible sounds.
Id.
52
AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1368.
53
Bell, supra n. 51, at http://inventors.about.com/od/mstartinventions/a/MPThree.htm. Mp3 technology
is an example of one type of sound compression technology, and not the specific technology taught in the
‘580 patent.
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Procedural History

On June 4, 2001, AT&T filed a patent infringement suit because of
the alleged infringement of AT&T’s ‘580 patent.54 Microsoft countered by
filing a motion for summary judgment,55 which included a motion in limine
to exclude and protect evidence of foreign sales.56 However, both parties
agreed to proceed as a motion of partial summary judgment.57
Microsoft argued two defenses to the infringement suit.58 First, it
argued that software is intangible, and therefore it cannot be a component
under § 271(f).59 In the alternative, Microsoft argued that even if Windows®
software was a component, it was not “supplied” from the U.S. because the
software put on the foreign computers was copied abroad and not created in
the U.S.60 The District Court rejected both of Microsoft’s arguments and
denied summary judgment.61 The court held that there was nothing in the
statutory text or legislative history to provide a basis for narrowly
interpreting § 271(f) to preclude software as a component.62 Next, the court
found that Microsoft “supplied” the golden master disk containing
Windows® (an essential component of the finished computer product) by
sending it overseas.63 The court held that it is irrelevant that copies put on
the foreign computers were not copied in the U.S.64 Both parties agreed to a
final judgment holding Microsoft liable for infringement of the ‘580 patent
under § 271(f).65
Microsoft appealed the case to the CAFC and made the same
arguments that the software is not a “component,” and foreign-copied
software is not “supplied” from the U.S.66 The CAFC affirmed the District
Court’s decision.67 The CAFC relied on Eolas68 in holding that software is a

_______________________________________________________
54

AT&T Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3340 at *1.
Id.
56
Id. at n. 3.
57
Id.
58
Id. at *3
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at **28-29.
62
Id. at **17-18 (“There is no limitation of the term ‘components,’ either in the statutory text or in the
legislative history [of Section 271(f)], to machines or other structural combinations . . . . Further, there is
nothing in the legislative history of Section 271(f) or in any jurisprudence interpreting it to say that
software cannot be a component under Section 271(f).”).
63
Id. at **24-25 (rejecting Microsoft’s argument that the software was not supplied by stating that
“Microsoft seeks to equate replication of the object code abroad with the manufacturing or ‘supply’ of it
from abroad. Microsoft’s argument ignores the undisputed fact that the object code is originally
manufactured in the United States, and supplied from the United States to foreign replicators or OEMs
[(original equipment manufacturer)] with the intention of incorporating such software into foreignassembled computers.”) (emphasis added).
64
Id.
65
AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1368.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 1372.
68
Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1325.
55
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component under § 271(f).69 The court found that, due to the inherent
nature of software and common practice in the industry, shipping one disk
or electronically transmitting software is “supplying” under § 271(f).70
E.

The Reasoning of the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Federal
Circuit

There were two issues before the CAFC in AT&T Corp. The first
issue before the court was whether software is a “component” under §
271(f).71 The next issue was whether software sent on a golden master disk,
or by electronic means, to foreign companies for replication constitutes
“supplied” for the purposes of § 271(f).72
Relying on Eolas, the court determined that software is a component
for the purposes of § 271(f).73 Patented software is often considered a
“process” invention because it involves a list of required steps to reach a
desired result.74 Microsoft argued in Eolas that the software on the golden
master disk was like a mold or a set of instructions.75 Microsoft also argued
that § 271(f) is limited to only structural patents because of the reaction of
Pellegrini.76 The court disagreed, stating that the copied versions of the
software were exact replicas of the original on the golden master disk.77 The
court found no evidence in the legislative history or within the statute itself
to find that the section is limited to only structural patents.78 The court
found that software is a component under § 271(f) for two reasons: 1)
section 271(f) is not limited to machines or physical structures and covers
process patents; and 2) software code is a “functional nucleus of the finished

_______________________________________________________
69

AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1369.
Id. at 1370.
Id. at 1369 (stating that “[t]he first question . . . [is] whether software may be a ‘component’ of a
patented invention under § 271(f)”).
72
Id. (stating that “[t]he remaining question, then, is whether software replicated abroad from a master
version exported from the United States—with the intent that it be replicated—may be deemed ‘supplied’
from the United States for the purposes of § 271(f)”).
73
Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1340. This case is factually similar to AT&T Corp. It involved Microsoft sending
the Eolas’ web browsing patented software, along with Windows®, on a golden master disk for overseas
replication. AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1368.
74
Id. at 1339 (“Without question, software code alone qualifies as an invention eligible for patenting
under these categories, at least as processes.”). For more discussion on software as a process patent, see
infra nn. 99-113 and accompanying text.
75
Id. The Eolas Court did not agree with this analogy, and stated that “software code is much more than
a prototype, mold, or detailed set of instructions.” Id.
76
Id. at 1340.
77
Id. (Holding that “Pelligrini requires only that components are physically supplied from the United
States. Pelligrini does not impose on section 271(f) a tangibility requirement that does not appear
anywhere in the language of that section.”).
78
Id. (“In fact, neither the statute nor the legislative history contains a limitation to ‘components of
machines and other structural combinations.’ Microsoft, in effect, asks this court to add the word
‘physical’ in front of ‘components’ in section 271(f). If the statute intended to limit the reach of
‘components of patented inventions,’ it would have expressly included some narrowing restriction. The
statute simply does not include the limitation that Microsoft advocates.”) (citations omitted).
70
71
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computer product.”79 Therefore the speech codec is a component of
Windows® under § 271(f).
Next, the court determined that Microsoft “supplied” the software
component for assembly overseas by sending Windows® either
electronically or on a golden master disk.80 The court began its statutory
analysis with a textual interpretation by giving the words “their ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning.”81 The court interpreted “supplied”
within § 271(f) in the context of software and software distribution.82
Software is typically created by generating a copy, or having the receiving
party download the content from the supplier.83 “Uploading a single copy to
the server is sufficient to allow any number of exact copies to be
downloaded, and hence ‘supplied.’”84 The court also stated that “Microsoft
has taken full advantage of the replicable nature of software to efficiently
distribute Windows® internationally.”85 Finally, the court held that under §
271(f) there was no difference between sending a golden master disk and
sending a copy electronically.86 In each instance, both versions were
supplied to the foreign entity for replication.87
The court, by interpreting software as a process which is vital to the
operation of a machine or computer, held that software is a component
under § 271(f). Additionally, Microsoft supplied AT&T’s software
component when it sent the Windows® golden master disk overseas for
foreign replication and distribution. The court got it right, but a reevaluation
of whether software truly is a process patent will further protect software
under § 271(f).

_______________________________________________________
79

Id. at 1339.
AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1369.
81
Id.; Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000) (stating that “fail,” in context of the statute,
“connotes some omission, fault, or negligence on the part of the person who has failed to do something”).
82
AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1369. Unlike the dissenting opinion, the majority interpreted the word
“supplied” within the context of software distribution, stating:
As the statute sets forth no specific definition of the word “supplied,” we
accordingly look to its “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,” which is
necessarily context-dependent. In the present case, § 271(f) is being invoked in
the context of software distribution. Therefore, in order for us to properly construe
the ‘supplied or caused to be supplied in or from the United States’ requirement,
we must look at the way software is typically “supplied.”
Id. In contrast, the dissenting opinion interpreted “supplied” in the following manner:
[T]his extraterritorial expansion flows from this court’s broad construction of
“supplies.” This court reasons that the “nature of the technology” justifies a
different, unordinary, and uncommon construction of that term. Thus, this court
distinguishes intangible software components from tangible components on the
grounds that “the ‘supplying’ of software commonly involves generating a copy.”
Id. at 1373.
83
Id. at 1370 (“Given the nature of the technology, the ‘supplying’ of software commonly involves
generating a copy.”).
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
80
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ANALYSIS

The CAFC was correct in determining that software is a component
under § 271(f), and it was supplied to foreign customers. First, a textual
interpretation of the word component results in the finding that software is a
component within the meaning of § 271(f). More specifically, the statute is
meant to include any type of invention under any patentable category of
invention. However, as will be seen, viewing software as a product patent
instead of a process patent will increase protection of software under §
271(f). Next, the plain meaning of the word supplied in § 271(f) includes
sending golden master discs or electronic transmissions. Finally, the
Pellegrini decision has no effect on software components because software
is more than a set of instructions, and the statute does not require the
component to be a physical item.
A.

Software is a Component within the Meaning of § 271(f)

The CAFC correctly held that software is unmistakably a
component within the meaning of the statute.88 The holding does not go far
enough, however, to finally put the issue of whether software is a
component to rest. Section 271(f) provides that one may not “suppl[y] or
cause[] to be supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial
portion of the components of a patented invention.”89 A component is
defined as “a simple part, or a relatively complex entity regarded as a part,
of a system; element; constituent.”90
In the present case, the patented speech codec is a component within
the plain meaning of the statute. The speech codec is a part or a complex
entity that, in addition with other parts (i.e. other software routines),
comprises the Microsoft Windows® operating system. Without the speech
codec, Windows® would not operate as we know it. Sounds either would
not be present within Windows®, or more likely, the sounds that were
incorporated would take much more memory, resulting in a less efficient
operating system.
The court essentially brushes off Microsoft’s argument that software
is not a component by relying on the analysis of the Eolas decision.91 The
question, however, requires a more detailed analysis to fully establish that
software is a component under § 271(f). The court in Eolas held that
software is “much more than . . . [a] detailed set of instructions.”92 Software

_______________________________________________________
88
Id. at 1369 (“The first question, i.e., whether software may be a ‘component’ of a patented invention
under § 271(f), was answered in the affirmative in Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft . . . .”).
89
35 U.S.C. § 271(f); see supra n. 1.
90
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 273 (William Morris ed., New College ed.,
Houghton Mifflin 1979).
91
Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1339-40; see supra n. 88 and accompanying text.
92
Id. at 1339.
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code is the “functional nucleus of the finished computer product.”93 The
Eolas court states that process patents94 are afforded the same patent law
protection as product95 patents.96 If the invention is patentable under 35
U.S.C. § 101, then it is a “component” under § 271(f).97 Therefore, a
component does not need to be physical to be protected by § 271(f).98
It is time to stop referring to software as a process patent, instead
the courts should start referring to it as a product patent. Product patents are
those patents in which the subject matter is either a machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter.99 On the other hand, “[a] process is not a
structural entity but rather an operation or series of steps leading to a useful
result.”100
Viewed as a product patent, software would be afforded greater
protection. Although the Eolas court gets close to stating that software is
product patent, it does not quite do so.101 It cites the lower court opinion
when declaring “process and product—software and hardware—are
practically interchangeable in the field of computer technology.”102 Without
software, much of the hardware that exists as circuits, hard drives, and
displays would not operate.103 The software code is just as important to the
system as the microprocessor, capacitor, integrated circuit, or the circuit
board itself. Removing a software component from a device or system is
essentially the same as removing a resistor or cutting circuit traces on the
circuit board. If the software component is removed, the device simply will
not work.
Classifying software as a process is based on faulty and outdated
logic. For many years, software was simply not patentable. Software’s long
and difficult road in becoming patentable is the reason for today’s issue of

_______________________________________________________
93
Id. (citing Imagexpo, L.L.C. v. Microsoft, Corp., 299 F. Supp. 2d 550, 553 (E.D. Va. 2003)) (stating
that software is the heart of the computer, and the computer would not operate correctly without it.).
94
See infra n. 99 and accompanying text.
95
See infra n. 100 and accompanying text.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents vol. 1, § 1.02, 11 (Matthew Bender 2005). “Three of the four
classes of statutory subject matter of utility patents (machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter)
relate to structural entities and can be grouped as ‘product’ claims in order to contrast them with process
claims.” Id.
100
Id. at § 1.03, 78. “Over the years, the courts have had more conceptual problems with process claims
than with product claims. Chemical processes were easily understood. Mechanical processes were
another matter.” Id.
101
Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1339 (stating “[w]ithout question, software code alone qualifies as an invention
eligible for patenting under these categories, at least as processes”).
102
Id.
103
Imagexpo, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 553.
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whether software is a component.104 Although the Patent and Trademark
Office has moved away from the “Mental Steps Doctrine,”105 it and the
courts have not moved far enough.106
Initially, algorithms were
unpatentable because they were viewed merely as ideas.107
The Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) is still behind the times
with regard to providing protection for patents. The PTO instructs its
examiners that a claim for software code, on its own without hardware, is
non-statutory subject matter.108 It further instructs that “[w]hen a computer
program is claimed in a process where the computer is executing the
computer program’s instructions, Office personnel should treat the claim as
a process claim.”109 It is only when a claim claims both an actual, physical
computer component and software will an examiner treat the software as a
product claim.110
At the micro level, it may be argued that a software routine is a set
of instructions.111 For example, a “While” loop may tell the hardware to
wait until a certain condition is true before it takes action.112 This is
certainly an instruction or a process. However, as one moves higher in
abstraction, the software is less of a “process” and more of a “product.”113

_______________________________________________________
104

See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972) (holding that a computer program for converting
BCD numerals to pure binary numbers was simply an idea or an algorithm and therefore not patentable
because “one may not patent an idea”).
105
The “Mental Steps Doctrine” states that a decision making process, or instruction like software, is not
patentable. See Roger E. Schecter & John R. Thomas, Intellectual Property The Law of Copyrights,
Patents and Trademarks § 14.5.1, 302 (West 2003); see also Chisum, supra n. 99, at § 1.03[6], 116
(stating that “the basic idea is that no patent can be obtained for a method an essential component of
which consists of human mental participation (or possibly even the mechanical equivalent of human
mental participation)”).
106
Id.; see also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187 (opening the door to the patentability of software by holding a
program that uses a well-known temperature algorithm in conjunction with a thermometer to calculate
the exact curing time of rubber was patentable, and that the applicants were not seeking to patent the
algorithm, but the process of curing the rubber); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(holding that mathematical computations used to create smooth and continuous lines on an oscilloscope
patentable because the computations created “useful, concrete and tangible results”).
107
Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71-72.
108
61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7482 (Feb. 28, 1996) (“Since a computer program is merely a set of instructions
capable of being executed by a computer, the computer program itself is not a process and Office
personnel should treat a claim for a computer program, without the computer-readable medium needed to
realize the computer program’s functionality, as non-statutory functional descriptive material.”).
109
Id.
110
Id. (“When a computer program is recited in conjunction with a physical structure, such as a computer
memory, Office personnel should treat the claim as a product claim.”).
111
See generally Computer Assoc. Intl. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707 (2d Cir. 1992) (“At a higher level
of abstraction, the instructions in the lowest-level modules may be replaced conceptually by the functions
of those modules. At progressively higher levels of abstraction, the functions of higher-level modules
conceptually replace the implementations of those modules . . . until finally, one is left with nothing but
the ultimate function of the program.”).
112
See Sun Microsystems, Inc., The Java™ Tutorial,
http://java.sun.com/docs/books/tutorial/java/nutsandbolts /while.html (accessed Mar. 7, 2006) (“You use
a while statement to continually execute a block of statements while a condition remains true.”).
113
See generally id.
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When analyzed in the context of a speech codec within Windows®,
a macro approach must be taken. The software becomes not a set of
instructions, but a tangible desired result.114 In this case, the tangible result
is compressed speech for use within the operating system.
Today, software is so integral to products because technology is
shifting away from analog systems and toward integrated and digital
systems.115 As this shift progresses and more complex integrated circuits
are developed, there is less of a need for physical and analog components.116
Software is doing the job that analog circuits have done in the past.117
Theoretically, a circuit may consist of a single microprocessor or
microcontroller, and the software that operates it. In this theoretical case,
the microcontroller and software are each fifty percent of the system.118
How can one argue that the software that runs this theoretical circuit is
simply a process and not an actual component to the system?
The distinction between a process patent and product patent is
important when considering whether software is a component. Previous
decisions have held that process patents are not protected by § 271(f).119
The court in both AT&T Corp. and Eolas did not address the decision in
Enpat Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., which held that process patents, such as the
disputed software in the case, were not components under § 271(f).120 When
evaluating the plaintiff’s claim that Microsoft Project 97 (and other
products) violated § 271(f) by copying their software overseas, the Enpat
Inc. court held that:
[P]laintiffs’ patent describes the steps required to

_______________________________________________________
114
Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1339 (stating “in the context of this patented invention, the computer transforms
the code on the golden disk into a machine component in operation”); see generally Alappat, 33 F.3d at
1544 (holding that an algorithm that created a smooth waveform created a “tangible result” and was thus
patentable); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir,
1998) (holding that a data processing system for managing mutual fund accounts created a tangible result
that an account manager could use to make decisions).
115
Peter Van Zant, Microchip Fabrication, 558-59 (5th ed., McGraw-Hill Professional 2004).
116
Id.
117
Ken Greenebaum & Ronen Barzel, Audio Anecdotes II: Tools, Tips, and Techniques for Digital
Audio, 93 (A K Peters 2004).
118
See generally Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1339 (stating that “process and product—software and hardware—
are practically interchangeable in the field of computer technology”).
119
See Enpat Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 6 F. Supp. 2d 537, 539 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding invalid a patent
that disclosed an automated, electronic network based, project management server system for managing
multiple work groups because “plaintiffs’ patent describes the steps required to accomplish a particular
task rather than the composition of a patented physical product”); see also Synaptic Pharm. Corp. v.
MDS Panlabs, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 452, 464 (D.N.J. 2002) (holding that § 271(f) does not apply to
method patents and therefore Synaptic’s assays (tests) to determine which compounds would bind with
receptors in the heart was not protected); Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d
1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that providing machines to perform a patented process overseas
does not implicate § 271(f) because no actual components were provided).
120
Enpat., 6 F. Supp. 2d at 539 (“While it is true that any process involves the use of physical objects,
this alone is not enough to bring a method patent within the purview of § 271(f), as the above cases
illustrate. We conclude that plaintiffs’ patent has no ‘components’ for purposes of § 271(f).”).
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accomplish a particular task rather than the composition
of a patented physical product. While it is true that any
process involves the use of physical objects, this alone is
not enough to bring a method patent within the purview
of § 271(f), as the above cases illustrate. We conclude
that plaintiffs' patent has no “components” for purposes
of § 271(f).121
The courts in AT&T Corp. and Eolas may have overruled Enpat
without expressly declaring it by stating that “software could very well be a
‘component’ of a patented invention for the purposes of § 271(f).”122
Although Enpat and related decisions may have been overruled, the
argument that software is a product and more than a process strengthens the
argument that software is a component for § 271(f) purposes.
The AT&T Corp. court made the correct decision in holding that
software is a component under § 271(f). The speech codec is essential to the
operation of Windows®. However, evaluating the speech codec and other
software programs as product patents will prevent litigation and finally
provide software with the protection it deserves.
B.

Sending Software Via a Golden Master Disk is Supplying
Under § 271(f)

The majority’s decision that Microsoft supplied the AT&T speech
codec and is therefore liable under § 271(f) is correct. This effectively
answers the question of whether software sent by electronic transmissions is
supplying the software. First, statutory interpretation yields the conclusion
that the method in which Microsoft distributes its software is supplying.
Second, it was the intent of Congress to close the loophole in Deepsouth for
all patent types.
1.

The Majority Was Correct When Interpreting the
Statute in the Context of Software Distribution

According to the plain meaning of the statute, Microsoft violated §
271(f) when it shipped the speech codec on a golden master disk to foreign
replicators. “Supply” is defined as “to give, furnish, or provide (what is
needed or wanted).”123 In this case, what is needed is the AT&T speech
codec contained in the Windows® source.124 Microsoft “provides” this code
by sending it to the foreign replicators by either golden master disk or
electronic transmission.125 Microsoft is supplying the software to be

_______________________________________________________
121

Id.
AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1369.
123
Webster’s New World College Dictionary 1438 (Michael Agnes, 4th ed., IDG Books Worldwide
2000) [hereinafter Webster’s].
124
AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1368.
125
Id.
122
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distributed within the plain meaning of the statute.
The majority was correct in interpreting the statute in light of the
inherent nature of the software, and how the software is distributed.126
Software is increasingly being distributed over the Internet by downloading
from a host server. The seller of the software saves time and money by not
requiring packaging materials and shipping costs.127 Providing one copy of
the software for further replication is supplying. There is no difference
between providing one copy or thousands because the end result is the
same—thousands of copies are supplied to the foreign distributor.
The holding in this case closed a loophole that allowed the
distribution of patented software components by electronic transmission.128
Hypothetically, what if instead of sending the golden master disks, the
foreign computer manufacturers downloaded the AT&T and Windows
software from a U.S. server upon assembly of the computer? Would this
scenario be a violation of § 271(f)? According to the majority, the answer is
yes.129 The software in this hypothetical situation is supplied to the user by
electronic transmission. There would be a violation even if the software is
downloaded from a foreign server where the software on the foreign server
was originally sent from the United States because the software would have
originally been provided from the United States. So long as a single copy is
provided from the U.S. by any means, it is supplying under § 271(f).
The dissenting opinion’s interpretation of the statute is misplaced.
First, it states that “supplying” cannot include “‘copying,’ ‘replicating,’ or
‘reproducing’” within the plain, ordinary meaning.130 This statement
admittedly ignores the context in which software is distributed.131 The
dissenting opinion states that the majority’s interpretation is too broad and
creates a new rule that is only applicable to software.132 However, one must
look at the nature in which software is distributed to determine the correct
interpretation. The plain meaning of the word “supply” includes to

_______________________________________________________
126
Id. at 1370. Thousands of software programs are purchased by downloading from the Internet
everyday. See generally CNET Networks, Inc., http://www.download.com/ (last accessed Mar. 7, 2006)
(listing thousands of free software programs for download); Microsoft Corp.,
http://www.microsoft.com/office/trial/default.mspx (last accessed Mar. 7, 2006) (listing various
Microsoft Office software titles available for download).
127
Id. at 1370 (stating that “Microsoft has taken full advantage of the replicable nature of software to
efficiently distribute Windows® internationally”).
128
See Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1340-41 (not addressing whether supplying software components via electronic
transmissions is within § 271(f)).
129
AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1370-71 (“Liability under § 271(f) does not depend on the medium used for
exportation: a disk is merely a container that facilitates physical handling of software, much like bottles
for liquids or pressurized cylinders for gases.”).
130
Id. at 1373-74 (Rader, J., dissenting).
131
Id. at 1374 (relying on a strict interpretation of “supply,” the dissent does not evaluate the term as it
relates to software distribution).
132
Id. (opining that the court uses a “broad construction of ‘supplies’” that leads to a rule which “applies
only to software inventions”).
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“furnish” or to “give” what is required.133 In the case of software
distribution today, it is typically “furnished” by either a golden master disk
or electronic transmission.134 To ignore this reality is to create a loophole
for software components.
Next, the dissenting opinion errs in stating that “[a]s a matter of
logic, one cannot supply one hundred components of a patented invention
without first making one hundred copies of the component, regardless of
whether the components supplied are physical parts or intangible
software.”135 Again, this statement ignores the realities of software
distribution. What is being supplied to the foreign replicators in this case is
the actual component provided by Microsoft.136 When software is copied,
the copied version is an exact, digital replica of the original version. It is the
same exact version that Microsoft provided on the golden master disk.137
Software companies provide their software everyday to millions of
customers without creating millions of copies to distribute by allowing
customers to download the software from their server.138 Therefore, it is
possible to supply one hundred software components without actually
creating one hundred components first. Both means create the same result
in that one hundred components are provided for foreign distribution.
2.

Congress Intended to Cover All Patent Types
When It Enacted § 271(f)

The majority was correct in deciding that Congressional intent
requires a finding that software is supplied when it is distributed using
traditional software distribution methods.139 Section 271(f) must be read in
light of both the entire body of law and the technology at issue.140 To do
otherwise would create a loophole similar to the loophole in Deepsouth that
§ 271(f) was intended to close. A special exception for software would be
created to the disadvantage of many software inventors.141 When read in
light of the entire Patent Act, all patents in all patentable categories are

_______________________________________________________
133

Webster’s at 1348.
AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1367-68 (majority).
Id. at 1373 (Rader, J., dissenting).
136
Id. at 1370 (majority) (stating that Microsoft sent an actual component).
137
Id. at 1368.
138
Supra n. 131 and accompanying text.
139
AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1371.
140
See U.S. Natl. Bank v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439, 455 (1993) (stating “[o]ver and over
we have stressed that ‘in expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of
a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy’”) (quoting U.S. v.
Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. 113, 122 (1849)).
141
This special exception would lead to unscrupulous companies bundling patented software, shipping a
disk over seas, and reaping profits from foreign sales of the patented software (much like Microsoft in
this case).
134
135
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covered by § 271(f).142
The dissent focuses its opinion on the fact that the Patent Act was
never meant to have extraterritorial effect.143 It correctly states that § 271(f)
was only meant to make companies liable for shipment of patented
components from the United States, and it was not meant to include the
actual manufacturing of patented products overseas.144 The dissenting
opinion states that under the majority opinion § 271(f) covers
“manufacturing activities occurring wholly abroad.”145 The dissent misses
the central holding of the majority and, as a result, creates an extreme
interpretation of the majority opinion. The statute has not been extended
extraterritorially to cover the activities of foreign manufacturers. It simply
covers the act of supplying the components for manufacture, just like the
deveiners in Deepsouth. The statute does not cause liability where unknown
manufacturers are copying the software that is not intentionally supplied by
a U.S. supplier. A company is only liable where it knowingly supplies a
copy of the software for distribution purposes, and it is only liable for
supplying the component, not for the act of foreign replication.146
Section 271(f) was created to stop manufacturers from building
components in the United States and shipping them overseas for
manufacture and assembly.147 In keeping with the intent of Congress, the
majority correctly does not carve out an exception for software under §
271(f) and holds that software supplied on a golden master disk to foreign
replicators violates the statute.148
C.

Pellegrini Has No Relevance in Software Distribution Cases

Microsoft has mistakenly taken the holding in Pellegrini to mean
that § 271(f) is limited to only physical components supplied from the

_______________________________________________________
142

35 U.S.C. § 271(f); see Inventions patentable, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (stating, “[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of
this title”).
143
AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1373 (Rader, J., dissenting); see also Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline
Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915) (stating that “infringement of this right cannot be predicated of acts
wholly done in a foreign country”); Intl. Rectifier Corp. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 361 F.3d 1355, 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that “it is well known that United States patent laws ‘do not, and were not
intended to, operate beyond the limits of the United States’”) (internal quotations omitted).
144
AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1373.
145
Id. at 1375.
146
35 U.S.C. § 271(f).
147
Id.
148
AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1371 (“Congress obviously intended the statute to have an extraterritorial
effect to the extent that the exportation was facilitated by acts in the United States, and the acts at issue
here originating from the United States can be understood to be similarly within the meaning of the
statute.”).
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Therefore, Microsoft argued that software, being
United States.149
intangible, is not afforded the protection of the statute.150 Courts have
recently limited the meaning of Pellegrini by holding that the word
“physical” does not affect what is a “component.”151
The majority correctly points out that what was transmitted overseas
in Pellegrini was the instructions on how to create the component, not the
actual component itself.152 In AT&T Corp., the actual components were
sent, not the instructions on how to make the component.153 Thus,
Pellegrini does not control.154 It is again helpful to think of software as a
product patent as opposed to a process patent because software is much
more than a set of instructions.155 In this case, the codec was not
instructions telling the foreign distributor how to create the software code of
the codec; it was the actual component Microsoft originally shipped
overseas.156
Again, the dissenting opinion misses the mark by using too strict an
interpretation of § 271(f), specifically the word supply. Under the dissent’s
view that Pellegrini controls the case, there should be no liability because
the components installed on the foreign computers, like the integrated
circuits in Pellegrini, were not physically supplied from the United States.157
Unlike the integrated circuits in Pellegrini, the software was the actual
component physically sent overseas.158 Although Microsoft only sent one
golden master disk containing the software, the subsequently copied
versions were identical and were caused to be supplied by the original
version shipped.159 Therefore, this fundamental difference between AT&T
Corp. and Pellegrini means that Pellegrini has no influence on this case.
Additionally, the majority held that liability does not turn on the
method of software distribution.160 This finally closes the door on the
physical requirement. One could argue that electronic transmission is not

_______________________________________________________
149
Id.; see Pellegrini,, 375 F.3d at 1118 (“Analog also does not supply ADMC chips in or from the
United States, and does not cause ADMC chips to be supplied in or from the United States. Thus, 35
U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) is inapplicable.”).
150
AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1371.
151
Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1340-41. The Court in Eolas upheld the Pellegrini requirement that “components
are physically supplied from the United States.” Id. at 1341. This did not clarify whether software
transmitted electronically is protected by the statute. However, in AT&T Corp., the Court holds that the
method of exportation is not significant; only the fact that exportation has occurred is significant. AT&T
Corp., 414 F.3d at 1371.
152
AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1370.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
See supra, § III(A), nn. 99-123 and accompanying text.
156
AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1370.
157
Pellegrini, 375 F.3d at 1118.
158
AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1370.
159
35 U.S.C. § 271(f).
160
AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1371.
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physically supplying a tangible object, and under Pellegrini there would be
no liability. However, electronic transmission is a physical mode of
exportation because electrons are transmitted recreating the component at
the desired location. In any event, the majority held that “[l]iablity under §
271(f) is not premised on the mode of exportation, but rather the fact of
exportation.”161 Therefore, the exportation does not have to be physical, and
any mode of exportation could cause liability under the statute.
IV.

CONCLUSION

AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp. provides software inventions with
all of the protection enjoyed by other physical inventions. Software, due to
the role that it plays with hardware and its importance in today’s products
and systems, is a component within the meaning of § 271(f). Next, shipping
a golden master disk or transmitting the original source code for foreign
replication creates liability under the statute. The mode of exportation for
software and any other patentable invention is no longer relevant.
The CAFC made the correct decision in its holding, and therefore
did not carve out an exception for software companies to escape liability by
sending one copy for replication. However, the holding would be
strengthened if the court performed its analysis in light of software being a
product patent, rather than a process patent.

_______________________________________________________
161

Id.
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